![]() ![]() ![]() There are ideas on how to mitigate this issue listed in the References below. I find this an odd design choice by Apple, who could easily keep the Cache.db file out of backups by default, or even encrypt the database and leverage the iOS Keychain for secure key storage.ĭevelopers hoping to mitigate this vulnerability can look to disable backups for the Caches directory or disable caching completely. All files should be reviewed, however SQLite databases and PLIST files in particular tend to be the most likely candidates for sensitive data.Ĭache.db almost always contains sensitive data, is created by default, and appears to also be backed up by default. Remember, there are far more files in local application storage that can inadvertently store sensitive data beyond the Cache.db file. Make sure you decode any base64 strings you find in the extracted PLISTs. You will be surprised by how much sensitive information you can find. Then, open all of the PLIST files in your editor and start searching for session tokens, sensitive server responses, and credentials. dump | grep ",X'\|,x'" | egrep -o "X\'*'" | awk -F"'" ''` do plutil -convert xml1 $plist done The following command will dump the Cache.db database, search for binary PLISTs, and save each to a file in our dataDump directory. This is the directory where our commands will save the extracted binary PLISTs. In the directory where you have your recovered Cache.db file, create a subdirectory dataDump. Unfortunately, we very rarely see SQLite databases encrypted in the local file store.įinally, we’ll convert the binary PLISTs to ASCII, so we can review them for sensitive data in a text editor. You would think that such tools would lead to an abundance of encrypted databases in mobile application development. While you may not wish to store a large amount of data in the Keychain or Keystore, you can easily encrypt a SQLite database using tools such as SQLCipher and keep the encryption key in the Keychain or Keystore. ![]() These secure storage tools are perfect for storing session tokens, cookies, passwords, and encryption keys. Both Android and iOS provide secure methods of storing sensitive data, by using the Android Keystore and the iOS Keychain. Sensitive information should not be stored in cleartext in the local files of an application. This is commonly in the form of SQLite databases stored in the application’s filesystem “sandbox”.Īs part of a mobile application assessment, TrustedSec reviews how data is stored and cached in these local files. Mobile applications can often work offline, and thus have a local store of data. Mobile application assessments diverge somewhat from normal web application assessments as there is an installed client application on a local device to go along with the backend server. By Drew Kirkpatrick in Application Security Assessment, Mobile Security Assessment, Penetration Testing, Program Assessment & Compliance, Program Development, Research, Security Testing & Analysis Insecure By Default ![]()
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